Military Intelligence of the Armed Forces of Ukraine 1917 - 1921

October 22, 2009
The constant need for comprehensive and objective information used for analysis and assessment of situation both in and outside Ukraine in 1917 – 1921 mainly to provide operational support pushed the military and political leadership of Ukraine towards creation of such an intelligence agency that would meet the demands of the time.

In 1917 – 1921, the mission of the military intelligence of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was to collect the intelligence data needed to prevent unsuspected enemy operations and guarantee forces’ readiness to carry out combat assignments in a tight timeframe. Under such conditions the intelligence service was assigned with the following tasks on the operational and strategic level: to guarantee timely detection of hostile forces’ preparations for military aggression towards Ukraine; to determine the disposition of hostile forces as well as their readiness to initiate the aggression (combat operations); to collect data on the strength, condition, manner of actions of the enemy forces as well as their organization and elements of their order of battle; to assume the measures aimed at disorganization of the enemy’s operations, disabling the enemy’s engineer facilities, firepower, armoured trains, cavalry and vehicles; to study the enemy’s morale as well as the sentiments of the local population in the planned areas of operations.  

Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
(1917 - 1918)


The intelligence activities were based upon the views of the military and political leadership in respect of the Armed Forces’ application in the struggle for the independence of Ukraine. The intelligence tasks were determined by the projected development of political relations between Ukraine and the adjoining states.  

Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
(1919 - 1921)



The overall control of the intelligence activities and determination of their primary course was carried out by the head of government. Military intelligence organization and planning tasks were assigned directly by the Military Minister via Chief Otaman or Chief of the General Staff who was in charge of the intelligence section. Later, the overall planning and organization of the military intelligence was performed by the Intelligence Section of the Main Directorate of the General Staff (MDGS). It provided the government and the military command with the intelligence information related to the activities of foreign armed forces and enemy plans. The Section also determined the intelligence tasks of the subordinate units and formations and exercised control of the human intelligence service.

Period of Tsentralna Rada (Central Council)
Intelligence of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Organization
(1917 - 29 April 1918)



The military intelligence service existed in two forms depending on the military and political situation in Ukraine and the participation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in combat operations: the first form was designed to conduct intelligence in behalf of the national security of Ukraine by intelligence bodies subordinate to the MDGS. The second one was meant to conduct intelligence in the period of combat operations. In that case, a subsidiary intelligence section under the Armed Forces HQ was organized, including intelligence operatives of the MDGS. That section exercised control of the activities conducted by reconnaissance units.

Period of the Hetmanat Intelligence of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Organization
(29 April - 14 December 1918)

Organization of the Military Intelligence of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 1918 - 1920

Under such conditions the intelligence tasks of the Armed Forces’ units and formations were narrowed down to selecting the means of data collection only. The “self-aimed” intelligence was conducted by the formations along with the performance of tasks assigned by the General Staff. That was attained directly by means of combatant units. The performance of such tasks was assigned to appropriate reconnaissance units.

Period of the Directory Intelligence of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Organization
(14 December 1918 - 1921)



The following reconnaissance units were formed to conduct reconnaissance missions: 

- Reconnaissance detachments operated in strength of at least half a cavalry troop or a whole troop and conducted reconnaissance in every form of battle in the most important sectors. The operation depth of such detachments was up to 25 km;

- Cavalry reconnaissance patrols usually operated in strength of 10 – 30 men at distances up to 15 km from the main force on the front and flanks, and up to 10 km from the reconnaissance detachment. The primary task of such patrols was to conduct terrain surveillance and to interrogate the local population. The patrols were organized from both reconnaissance units and cavalry units. The latter could be enhanced with professional reconnaissance men;


Cavalry reconnaissance unit

- Foot patrol teams (tactical patrols) operated in strength of up to 10 men and conducted reconnaissance to the depth of up to 5 km from the front friendly trenches in every form of battle. Foot patrols could be enhanced with combatant units’ personnel to conduct reconnaissance at larger distances. They could also cooperate with cavalry reconnaissance patrols. The tasks assigned to cavalry and foot patrols encompassed enemy forces detection and surveillance. Upon detecting the enemy, cavalry patrols dispersed to conduct reconnaissance on the flanks while foot patrols operated in width trying to evade any encounter with the enemy;

- Observation posts and listening posts were employed as both reconnaissance and security elements. They were set up during defence and stationing of troops. Such elements were organized from 2-3 men. Their primary mission was to provide timely detection of the enemy and informing friendly commands.



Artillery reconnaissance was conducted by artillery observation posts (AOP) and reconnaissance parties. AOP’s were organized from cannon regiments or batteries to survey the terrain, detect and determine the coordinates of the enemy firing equipment, adjust friendly artillery fire etc. Normally, 2-3 men were dispatched to organize an AOP.

Reconnaissance parties deployed by commanders of cannon units were to conduct reconnaissance on the terrain and movement routs, to pick positions for the AOP’s as well as firing positions for friendly artillery. A reconnaissance party incorporated 6-10 men. The primary missions of artillery reconnaissance were: to find and determine positions for placing observation posts and friendly weapons; to examine approaches to friendly positions; to detect and monitor enemy artillery e.g. re-positioning, disabling of cannons etc; to provide friendly artillery with timely intelligence reports needed to conduct fire; to study the terrain in terms of suitability for the friendly artillery’s primary and supplementary firing positions. As a rule, artillery reconnaissance elements would be deployed in advance to determine the positions for observation posts even before the principal forces approach the area. At the beginning of or during the combat operations, artillery reconnaissance operated jointly with the enabling force in order to guarantee the effective use of artillery.

Engineer reconnaissance was conducted by means of officer reconnaissance parties organized from engineer units’ personnel. They were dispatched to conduct reconnaissance over roads, bridges, water barriers and terrain. In addition, they could conduct reconnaissance over the enemy’s engineer facilities both before the enemy’s front trenches and in his rear. The strength of such party could equal from 3 men to a squad. In some cases the engineer intelligence tasks could be undertaken by the foot patrol teams enhanced by the engineer units’ specialists.

Human intelligence on the strategic level was performed by the clandestine network operating abroad. Whereas on the operational level the missions were performed by special members (mobile agents) deployed by the formations of the field army currently in operation as well as by agent posts run by 1-3 agents who normally were the local inhabitants of a populated point that lay on the forces’ main routs. Agent posts were linked by the appropriate human intelligence points that accumulated the intelligence information.

Because there were no intelligence components directly subordinate to the MDGS (except the human intelligence), the MDGS leadership had to assign intelligence tasks directly to troops. According to UNR Southern army group Commander, Lt.-Gen. M. Omelyanovych-Pavlenko, the intelligence planning was initially done by formations’ commanders and their chiefs of staff. On 14 April 1920, Commander of UNR southern army group held a briefing attended by the commanders of Kyiv, Zaporizhya and Volyn divisions. Discussed during the briefing were the issues related to the planned offensive against Voznesenske on 16 April 1920. The briefing was primarily aimed at discussing the intelligence support of the offensive and tasking the reconnaissance elements with intelligence collection. It was the information provided by the reconnaissance elements on 15 April that was used to specify the tasks of the subordinate units and formations. Adjustment of the forces’ actions allowed to carry out the combat mission successfully.

Intelligence sections of the formations’ HQ’s were directly in charge of distributing the intelligence tasks, reconnaissance units’ application planning and control. Divisional (regimental) HQ’s also incorporated officers involved in a more particular reconnaissance planning in behalf of their units and formations. According to the Armed Forces “Field Service Regulation” of UNR, each unit or formation commander was responsible for timely reconnaissance and performing of tasks assigned to him.

Legal intelligence was conducted by military agents (military attaché) and their aides in accordance with the “Guide for foreign military agents under the diplomatic missions (in respect of intelligence)” of 31 May 1918. Described in the Guide were the responsibilities of military agents (attaché), procedures and time of submitting the intelligence information as well as forms of intelligence reports. The analysis of data submitted to the intelligence section of the General Staff shows that the majority of reports received from foreign attaché were based upon information collected from the Mass Media. In particular, an article printed in the German “Fossische Zeintung” (11 May 1919) which the military attaché in Berlin sent to the intelligence section on 23 May 1919 deals with the re-organization of the German Army. Another news report published in “Kievskaya Mysl” informs of the situation on the German-Turkish front in 1919.



Multipurpose biplane “DFW C.V.”
(German-built)
It was used by Armed Forces of Ukraine in 1919-1921 

The aerial reconnaissance missions were performed through employment of combat aircraft or other types of aircraft equipped to conduct reconnaissance flights. The significant features of such aircraft were the light weight and manoeuvrability. The results of surveillance conducted at distances of up to 10-15 km were immediately reported directly to unit commanders. Such surveillance covered the results of artillery fire, detection of enemy reserves etc. The information could be airdropped in a prescribed location in the area of disposition of friendly forces. The conduct of aerial reconnaissance was planned in advance to support operations involving the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The aerial reconnaissance in that case was conducted by means of Odessa, Kyiv and Kharkiv tactical groups; the Odessa group was planned to employ 10 aircraft, Kyiv and Kharkiv groups had 15 aircraft each. The created air triangle allowed the Command of the Armed Forces to identify the potential enemy aggression and monitor the enemy operations on Ukrainian territory. Odessa sector monitored the coastal territory of the Black Sea, Kharkiv sector was in charge of the Ukrainian-Russian border; the responsibility of Kyiv tactical group was to monitor the Polish border. 


Reconnaissance biplane “Hansa-Brandendurg C” 
(produced in Austria-Hungary)
It was used by Armed Forces of Ukraine in 1919-1921 

Visual surveillance was extensively used for conducting aerial reconnaissance missions. Those could be carried out by means of both combat aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft. The latter differed from combat aircraft by the co-pilot seat and photography gear. The surveillance from combat aircraft was conducted by the pilot directly; the results of surveillance were simply memorized. Almost all intelligence collected by the second pilot of reconnaissance aircraft was mapped or sketched as a graphic document. The main downside of aerial reconnaissance by combat aircraft was the inability of a single pilot to collect a large amount of data.

The following missions were carried out during reconnaissance flights: discovering of enemy forces’ disposition, location of enemy reserves, cavalry and armoured vehicles; disclosing the command-and-control posts, enemy assault lines or deployment lines; aerial photography of the terrain.

Based upon the technical capabilities of the aircraft, a single plane was able to conduct reconnaissance flights to up to 150 km from the friendly front line. Meanwhile, a possibility existed for join operations of the aircraft and cavalry detachments dispatched to destroy the most important targets in the enemy rear. The operation depth of such detachments was up to 40-60 km.

The naval intelligence was planned and conducted in accordance with the Law “On the appointment of naval agents under the embassies of the Ukrainian state” (of 4 July 1918). Appropriate intelligence elements incorporated Naval attaché and their secretaries and operated in Austria, Germany, Russia, Romania, Turkey and Hungary. Planning of the naval intelligence was carried out by the Naval Department of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.