Ukrainian reconnaissance men in the Afghan war of 1979-1989
February 8, 2011
As the years pass, the events of the Afghan war become more and more distant. That was a war that lasted 3340 days or 9 years, 1 month and 20 days. More than 600, 000 soldiers of the former Soviet Union troops passed through its crucible. It took lives of more than 15 thousand people, each fifth of which was Ukrainian. For the Soviet troops it was the second largest war since the end of the Second World War.
As the years pass, the events of the Afghan war become more and more distant. That was a war that lasted 3340 days or 9 years, 1 month and 20 days. More than 600, 000 soldiers of the former Soviet Union troops passed through its crucible. It took lives of more than 15 thousand people, each fifth of which was Ukrainian. For the Soviet troops it was the second largest war since the end of the Second World War.
The Afghan war was a rather peculiar one, and it is often called “the war of scouts”. In the course of war, standard reconnaissance system of the 40th Army became an extremely powerful force with strong reconnaissance facilities. In the period of 1979-1989, a great number of reconnaissance men served in Afghanistan, among them there were a lot of Ukrainians and those who were not ethnic Ukrainians, but were tightly bound to Ukraine – either by the birthplace, education, service (before or after Afghanistan – in the Armed Forces of Ukraine), or by the acquired comrade-in-arms etc.
Dedicated to the cherished memory, courage and honour of the dead and alive scouts who carried out their military duty in Afghanistan
One of the first Soviet reconnaissance units to appear in Afghanistan before the introduction of the limited contingent was separate Special Forces (SF) battalion. The unit was formed in May 1979, in the town of Chirchik (Uzbekistan). Soon, it went down to the Afghan war history as the so-called “Muslim battalion”.
In the middle of November 1979, that battalion was airlifted to Afghanistan, and on December 27, it took part in the occupation of Afghanistan Government residence and its Defence ministry. After the task was completed, the “Muslim battalion” was withdrawn to the place of its permanent stationing in Chirchik.
At the end of December 1979, the introduction of Soviet troops to the country began. The units took important administrative bodies, industrial facilities, airfields, lines of communication and main roads under their control. One of the first units to enter the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was 781st separate reconnaissance battalion, 108th motorized rifle division (MRD).
After the limited contingent entered the Afghan territory, it was rather swiftly involved to internal armed confrontation in Afghanistan.
Despite such a quick involvement, the Soviet troops soon understood that the nature of warfare there had been drastically different from the postulates of those-times Soviet military science and its training regulations statements. So, in the conditions of mountains and deserts, regular army battle tactics against the armed opposition groups proved inefficient. Mujahedeen acted in small detachments and groups, quickly attacked and instantaneously retreated.
Local nature of warfare and adversary’s tactics demanded rapid reaction and precise responses – the Afghan war proved that under such conditions the most efficient results can be achieved by separate units complemented with morally and physically prepared personnel. Reconnaissance units met almost all of the mentioned requirements.
The formation of the 40th Army reconnaissance system was started after the introduction of Soviet troops to the DRA. At the first stage, only staff reconnaissance units were included to the formations. They were able to provide the staff headquarters with data about the enemy, but only in the area of their immediate proximity. The Army included three separate reconnaissance battalions (sep recon bn): 781st sep recon bn, 108th motorized rifle division (Bagram city, the central part of the DRA), 783rd sep recon bn, 201st motorized rifle division (Kunduz, the northern part of the country) and 650th Guards sep recon bn, 5th motorized rifle division (Shindad, the western part of the state). Besides, reconnaissance companies (recon co) also comprised motorized rifle, armoured and paraborne regiments. 469th SF separate company stationed in Kabul was also among the 40th Army units.
At the beginning of 1980, mutual raids of the reinforced detachments and the DRA forces became the main method of the Soviet troops operation. Raids were carried out in the areas of the enemy’s possible location. They were mostly limited to the roads, valleys and other directions where it was possible to use combat equipment. The efficiency of the raids in many respects depended on the response actions of mujahedeen – if they went over to open armed confrontation, the Soviet units started fire attack against armoured groups and aviation; if the adversary avoided action hiding among the local citizens or in the mountains, the efficiency of the raids was rather low.
The late 1980 was marked by activation of the 40th Army reconnaissance elements. The troops started to practice pointed strikes instead of raids against particular armed opposition groups.
On October 10, 1980, the Army commander made a report to the Minister of Defence of the USSR: “It is impossible to leave the intensity of warfare at the same level or extend it. This could lead to further conflict escalation and cause side effects, as it could attract vast masses to join the militants’. Despite the warning, the Soviet top brass insisted on further combat.
In March 1981, the Soviet Union Central Committee of the Communist Party administrative division analysed the course of Afghan campaign. The particular conclusion made by the division was that experience had proved right – large military operations were inefficient from the military point of view. Sometimes such operations can even damage the political situation.
Standard conduct of operations with open advance of Soviet forces to military communities and long-lasting marches to the operation areas warned mujahedeen. Flexible responses, unplanned attacks and small operations arranged on the basis of intelligence were started to call “intelligence implementation” and gained further development.
Reconnaissance took important place in the hostilities, and it became clear that it was necessary to enhance its role. To arrange continuous area surveillance, a system of outposts and observation posts was deployed. They were mostly placed near key objects of troops’ disposition and infrastructure. Altogether, there were more than 800 outposts and posts equipped to conduct all-round defence. Besides, the Soviet troops’ command paid particular attention to the deployment of electronic intelligence system on the territory of the DRA. For that purpose, in 1980, separate radio bearing battalion was added to the Army units. In 1984, it was reformed into a separate Special Task Forces electronic regiment. The regiment’s units were located in the cities of Kabul, Kandahar and Shindad.
Despite the intensification of warfare, the opposition significantly increased its numbers and resorted to vigorous actions. In winter 1983, the war acquired new features: when the war just started, armed opposition groups used to spread all over kishlaks or moved abroad with the advent of winter, but then, in 1983, the militants’ detachments stayed in Afghanistan and were at war the whole year.
To be able to lead the permanent war, mujahidin built a system of bases and camps. Some bases were large and comprised arms depots, headquarters, communication centres, arms repair bases, hospitals and studying centres. In order to build the bases, mujahedeen skilfully used natural shelters. Many camps were created in the mountainous area; they were well camouflaged and heavily guarded. But the bases’ new infrastructure demanded an improved arms and materiel supply system from Afghan guerrillas.
Air raids and artillery bombardments against the opposition’s bases were very often inefficient. The attempt to apply motorized rifle units to occupy them has also proved wrong and unsuccessful – mujahidin managed to take the equipment and materiel away and withdraw the units, till Soviet troops planned the operation and advanced to the enemy’s bases locations. To make prompter attacks on the adversary’s camps, the Soviet command tried to use helicopter assault forces. But heavy anti-aircraft coverage of armed opposition groups, enemy’s skilful use of mine obstacles and their well-organized fire system caused that operations very often appeared to be ineffective and assault forces took heavy losses.
Besides, the operation area was surrounded by the assault units which were assigned not to let the mujahidin from the entrapment. In the course of the operation, Afghan guerrillas tried to penetrate the surrounded ravine and levelled the major attack on reconnaissance assault company (recon aslt co) under the command of senior lieutenant Ihor Ploskonos. Because of thick fog, aviation units could not give fire support to the scouts and deliver reinforcement. In total encirclement, Ploskonos’s company had to beat off the enemy for more than three days. On November 15, 1983, in accordance with the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Ihor Ploskonos was awarded the Title of Hero of the Soviet Union for his skilful command of the company during the combat mission in Marmolske ravine, for saving the personnel’s lives, as well as for the displayed courage and heroism while carrying his international duty.
Considering the situation, better results were achieved by preventive measures which included blocking the caravan tracks. But even that was accompanied by a number of problems.
In Afghanistan, the occupation of caravanner has been passed from generation to generation. From the childhood, caravanners learned the country and its roads to perfection. Cargoes were meticulously protected by the most experienced mujahidin. Caravans were mostly small and consisted of one or several cars or camels and horses. Large caravans counted to 100 pack animals or cars, and were well guarded. While leading the caravan, Afghan guerrillas paid much attention to route reconnaissance.
Soviet reconnaissance faced numerous difficulties in exposing caravans. The most widespread reasons for that were great numbers of caravan routes and long periods of time needed for the gained information to reach the units blocking the caravan. Ambushes appeared to be an efficient tactics under such circumstances. But from the reconnaissance men it demanded perfect physical conditions and endurance, ability to orientate under harsh situation and terrain conditions, as well as to carefully camouflage, use war ruse and invent new tactical techniques and methods of operation.
In the early 1984, the 40th Army command developed a plan “Zanaves” (“The Curtain”). It provided for a set of actions on blocking the caravan tracks and cutting the supply of arms and ammunition to the armed opposition groups. According to the plan, some Army units were appointed to the zones of responsibility on the tensest directions on the Pakistan border – the southern and the eastern ones. The total length of the zones was more than 1000 km, and the depth - 100-300 km. The main load of the mission was placed on the reconnaissance units of the limited contingent, but motorized rifle units were also involved to the implementation of the plan.
Noteworthy that ambushes arranged by combined arms units were also rather inefficient. That was mostly caused by the too large zones of responsibility, low operability and harsh terrain. Greater efficiency was shown by special reconnaissance elements. Despite the appropriate level of training and sophisticated tactics of Special Forces units, they were applied limitedly and without its intended purpose till 1984.
In October 1981, two separate Special Forces detachments – 154 SF sep det and 177 SF sep det – entered Afghanistan. They were deployed in the north of the country and were assigned to guard important industrial facilities. On February 10, 1984, 173 SF sep det was also brought to the DRA. It was stationed in Kandahar, frontier town on the caravan tracks crossing, which is a key post in the control system of the southern west of the country.
At the end of winter 1984, the Army command started to use Special Forces units according to its intended purposes. 177 SF sep det was transferred to the town of Hazni, situated on the important main road which unites the whole territory of the DRA. 154 SF sep det was deployed on the Pakistan direction in the town of Jalalabad. In autumn 1984, 668 SF sep det joined the 40th Army and was deployed near the town of Bahram, but in March 1985, it was transferred to Baraki.
Unlike standard structure of the Soviet Army Special Forces units of that time, SF detachments were armed with mechanized combat vehicles (infantry combat vehicles, airborne combat vehicles, armoured reconnaissance vehicles, and armoured infantry vehicles).
Major reconnaissance means were: examination, observation, ambushes, and reconnaissance search activities. The SF units widely used reconnaissance facilities of electronic intelligence, reconnaissance monitoring apparatus, air and secret agent intelligence.
One of the main tasks of the SF units was to expose and destroy (occupy) mujahidin caravans. In the course of the caravan exposure operation, the most difficult part was the advance of SF reconnaissance group to the place of possible caravan track because of the well-adjusted and highly branched system of enemy’s human intelligence.
In winter 1984-1985, ambushes with track-type and wheel vehicles appeared to be inefficient. At that period of time, Soviet troops laid about 1, 500 ambushes. But the percentage of successful operations stayed rather low. However, ambushes applying helicopters, which when necessary could support the scouts with fire and evacuate them, appeared to be more efficient.
The most drastic changes in the activity of SF units happened in March 1985, when they were reformed and significantly reinforced. Moreover, the number of SF detachments was doubled. In particular, 334 SF sep det (located in Asadabad), 370 SF sep det (deployed in Lashkarh), 186 SF sep det (situated in Shakhdjoi) and 411 SF sep det (stationed in Fary) arrived to Afghanistan.
Structurally, SF detachments were joined into two brigades – 15 SF sep bde and 22 SF sep bde with HQs in Jalalabad and Lashkargakh. Each detachment’s strength was about 500 people, the total personnel’s complement of the both brigades was near 4, 000 people.
15 SF sep bde included 154, 177, 688, and 334 SF separate detachments, and 22 SF sep bde comprised 173, 370, 186, and 411 SF separate detachments.
All the SF units acted rather successfully. In particular, till the end of 1985, the scouts of 186 SF sep det conducted more than 200 combat operations and 45 survey flights. During such operations, the command mostly involved reconnaissance groups, reconnaissance detachments were rarely applied. Ambushes were the main reconnaissance means used in the operations. During them, units managed to destroy 370 mujahedeen, 34 cars and a great amount of ammunition; they also took 15 prisoners and acquired many weapons.
In late 1985, each SF brigade was reinforced by helicopter squadrons (hel sqn). 15 SF sep bde received 239 sep hel sqn, and 22 SF sep bde was enhanced by 205 sep hel sqn. The squadrons were added to support the activity of SF units. They were trained how to act in mountainous and desert terrain and were equipped with helicopters Mi – 8MT and Mi – 24.
Reinforcement of Special Forces’ units by helicopter squadrons influenced the tactics of scouts. In particular, the units’ command started to actively use observation groups, which by day and night surveyed caravan routes and tracks on helicopters, to observe large areas in order to track and intercept caravans.
The use of observation groups appeared to be rather efficient. During such survey flights in 1986, 186 SF sep det destroyed about 300 mujahidin and 6 cars, took 30 prisoners; and in 1987 the detachment managed to destroy 600 Afghan guerrillas, 39 cars, 34 motorcycles, took 17 prisoners and acquired a great amount of arms.
In addition to the task to fight against armed opposition groups, SF units were assigned to capture foreign military advisers cooperating with mujahidin, and acquire samples of modern armaments delivered to the militants by the Western countries.
Among the enemy’s armaments, high-technology equipment was of the greatest interest for the Soviet troops. In particular, they were interested in communication devices, mines and man-portable air defence systems. The appearance of new man-portable air defence systems “Stinger” in service of mujahidin in 1986 led to significant losses of the 40th Army aviation and limited the use of Soviet troops’ army and assault aviation – the most powerful support weapon of combined arms units’ activity. In order to work out countermeasures against the mujahidin’s air defence system, it was urgent to obtain the sample of MANPAD.
In autumn 1986, SF recon group from 173 SF sep det captured first samples of Stinger missile under Kandahar.
The Soviet top brass made the decision to withdraw Soviet troops, and announced the policy of national reconciliation. The 40th Army command gave instructions that since January 15, 1987, it had been abolished to level air and artillery strikes against armed opposition groups; the army should only guard garrisons, roads and objects. But the strategy to wind up large-scale warfare had nothing to deal with Special Forces; their role had even increased. Since spring 1987, “The Barrier” system had been launched. According to the system, a set of barrage lines was created and distributed on the east and south-east of the DRA to cover it with a chain of posts and ambushes to block the caravans’ and gangs’ movement to the centre of the country.
To arrange combat operations to the territory controlled by the enemy the scouts had to be more and more ingenious. Units broadly used combined secret advances to reconnaissance areas, long and secret observation over the reconnaissance objectives, comprehensive means of deluding the enemy about the reconnaissance targets, efforts to attract (coerce to advance) the enemy to the previously mined areas.
In early 1987, SF units conducted 840 reconnaissance operation flights. In this interval of time, Special Forces destroyed 131 caravans, 80 cars and 1416 mujahidin, captured 69 MANPADs, 4500 rocket missiles, 9000 kg of drugs and 2, 8 mln of charges – that was the third part of all the trophies of the 40th Army.
According to the 40th Army command estimates, their troops managed to intercept no more than the fifth part of all the caravans. There were some miscalculations and errors. They mostly happened because of inaccurate reconnaissance data and failures in reconnaissance planning and conduct; besides, underestimation of the enemy’s forces led to tragic consequences. SF groups were also several times entrapped by Afghan guerrillas.
In May 1988, with the beginning of the troops’ withdrawal, 154, 334, 173, 411, 370 and 186 SF separate detachments were withdrawn from Afghanistan to the USSR.
In autumn 1988, 177 and 668 SF separate detachments were left in the DRA and acted in the north of the country and around Kabul. The main Special Forces’ tasks in the last months of the war were to intercept caravans and prevent mujahidin from bombarding the capital of Afghanistan and Soviet troops’ columns that moved from the country.
In order to achieve this, the command put additional roadblocks and strong points along the roads and on important heights. They were assigned to guard the troops’ halting places and prevent attempts of mujahidin to approach the roads. The SF operations area has gradually decreased, but despite that, the 40th Army reconnaissance units managed to capture 417 caravans during the late 1988.
Reconnaissance companies of 371 and 101 motorized rifle regiments covered the withdrawal of troops from Herat and Shindad in the western direction, 701 sep recon bn, 108 motorized rifle division and 783 sep recon bn, 201 motorized rifle division covered the forces in the eastern direction. Altogether, 199 sentry outposts were put out in the western direction from Kabul to the Soviet border.
The scouts of 783 sep recon bn became the last Soviet military men who left the territory of Afghanistan. They accompanied the 40th Army commander, and on February 15, 1989, crossed the state border.
Dedicated to the cherished memory, courage and honour of the dead and alive scouts who carried out their military duty in Afghanistan
One of the first Soviet reconnaissance units to appear in Afghanistan before the introduction of the limited contingent was separate Special Forces (SF) battalion. The unit was formed in May 1979, in the town of Chirchik (Uzbekistan). Soon, it went down to the Afghan war history as the so-called “Muslim battalion”.
In the middle of November 1979, that battalion was airlifted to Afghanistan, and on December 27, it took part in the occupation of Afghanistan Government residence and its Defence ministry. After the task was completed, the “Muslim battalion” was withdrawn to the place of its permanent stationing in Chirchik.
At the end of December 1979, the introduction of Soviet troops to the country began. The units took important administrative bodies, industrial facilities, airfields, lines of communication and main roads under their control. One of the first units to enter the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was 781st separate reconnaissance battalion, 108th motorized rifle division (MRD).
After the limited contingent entered the Afghan territory, it was rather swiftly involved to internal armed confrontation in Afghanistan.
Despite such a quick involvement, the Soviet troops soon understood that the nature of warfare there had been drastically different from the postulates of those-times Soviet military science and its training regulations statements. So, in the conditions of mountains and deserts, regular army battle tactics against the armed opposition groups proved inefficient. Mujahedeen acted in small detachments and groups, quickly attacked and instantaneously retreated.
Local nature of warfare and adversary’s tactics demanded rapid reaction and precise responses – the Afghan war proved that under such conditions the most efficient results can be achieved by separate units complemented with morally and physically prepared personnel. Reconnaissance units met almost all of the mentioned requirements.
The formation of the 40th Army reconnaissance system was started after the introduction of Soviet troops to the DRA. At the first stage, only staff reconnaissance units were included to the formations. They were able to provide the staff headquarters with data about the enemy, but only in the area of their immediate proximity. The Army included three separate reconnaissance battalions (sep recon bn): 781st sep recon bn, 108th motorized rifle division (Bagram city, the central part of the DRA), 783rd sep recon bn, 201st motorized rifle division (Kunduz, the northern part of the country) and 650th Guards sep recon bn, 5th motorized rifle division (Shindad, the western part of the state). Besides, reconnaissance companies (recon co) also comprised motorized rifle, armoured and paraborne regiments. 469th SF separate company stationed in Kabul was also among the 40th Army units.
At the beginning of 1980, mutual raids of the reinforced detachments and the DRA forces became the main method of the Soviet troops operation. Raids were carried out in the areas of the enemy’s possible location. They were mostly limited to the roads, valleys and other directions where it was possible to use combat equipment. The efficiency of the raids in many respects depended on the response actions of mujahedeen – if they went over to open armed confrontation, the Soviet units started fire attack against armoured groups and aviation; if the adversary avoided action hiding among the local citizens or in the mountains, the efficiency of the raids was rather low.
| In September 1980, Major General Borys Tkach became the commander of the 40th Army. Thanks to his efforts, in two years, the limited contingent’s units and formations received the new special command, stationing and logistics system. Borys Tkach was among those pioneers who planned and arranged the first large-scale combat operations of Soviet troops against the armed opposition groups. |
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| Then, one of the important tasks set for the Soviet troops was to provide aid and maintain cooperation with the DRA forces. In order to achieve this, the USSR sent military advisers to Afghanistan, who were assigned to help Afghan commanders and staff headquarters. In 1980-1982, Major General Oleksii Petrokhalko, former chief intelligence officer of Kyiv military district, was appointed military adviser on intelligence to the Chief of Staff of the DRA Armed Forces. In his tenure of office in Afghanistan, the DRA troops gained and practiced new foundations of strategic and combat reconnaissance systems operation. |
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On October 10, 1980, the Army commander made a report to the Minister of Defence of the USSR: “It is impossible to leave the intensity of warfare at the same level or extend it. This could lead to further conflict escalation and cause side effects, as it could attract vast masses to join the militants’. Despite the warning, the Soviet top brass insisted on further combat.
In March 1981, the Soviet Union Central Committee of the Communist Party administrative division analysed the course of Afghan campaign. The particular conclusion made by the division was that experience had proved right – large military operations were inefficient from the military point of view. Sometimes such operations can even damage the political situation.
Standard conduct of operations with open advance of Soviet forces to military communities and long-lasting marches to the operation areas warned mujahedeen. Flexible responses, unplanned attacks and small operations arranged on the basis of intelligence were started to call “intelligence implementation” and gained further development.
Reconnaissance took important place in the hostilities, and it became clear that it was necessary to enhance its role. To arrange continuous area surveillance, a system of outposts and observation posts was deployed. They were mostly placed near key objects of troops’ disposition and infrastructure. Altogether, there were more than 800 outposts and posts equipped to conduct all-round defence. Besides, the Soviet troops’ command paid particular attention to the deployment of electronic intelligence system on the territory of the DRA. For that purpose, in 1980, separate radio bearing battalion was added to the Army units. In 1984, it was reformed into a separate Special Task Forces electronic regiment. The regiment’s units were located in the cities of Kabul, Kandahar and Shindad.
Despite the intensification of warfare, the opposition significantly increased its numbers and resorted to vigorous actions. In winter 1983, the war acquired new features: when the war just started, armed opposition groups used to spread all over kishlaks or moved abroad with the advent of winter, but then, in 1983, the militants’ detachments stayed in Afghanistan and were at war the whole year.
To be able to lead the permanent war, mujahidin built a system of bases and camps. Some bases were large and comprised arms depots, headquarters, communication centres, arms repair bases, hospitals and studying centres. In order to build the bases, mujahedeen skilfully used natural shelters. Many camps were created in the mountainous area; they were well camouflaged and heavily guarded. But the bases’ new infrastructure demanded an improved arms and materiel supply system from Afghan guerrillas.
Air raids and artillery bombardments against the opposition’s bases were very often inefficient. The attempt to apply motorized rifle units to occupy them has also proved wrong and unsuccessful – mujahidin managed to take the equipment and materiel away and withdraw the units, till Soviet troops planned the operation and advanced to the enemy’s bases locations. To make prompter attacks on the adversary’s camps, the Soviet command tried to use helicopter assault forces. But heavy anti-aircraft coverage of armed opposition groups, enemy’s skilful use of mine obstacles and their well-organized fire system caused that operations very often appeared to be ineffective and assault forces took heavy losses.
| In February 1983, the 40th Army command carried out liberation military operation in Marmolske ravine. They needed to release Soviet civil specialists who were previously took prisoners by mujahedeen in the town of Mazari-Sharif. In the ravine, militants built a powerful system of fortifications and strong points which protected large cave arms and ammunition depots. Those were the storages that supplied armed opposition groups fighting against shuravi in the north of Afghanistan. The ravine’s defence was ensured by more than 1300 mujahedeen. The Soviet units, involved in the operation, included separate SF detachment, two motorized rifle battalions, sep recon bn, artillery units and about 40 helicopters; the DRA Armed Forces were presented by infantry division units, separate brigade of commandos and police regiment. |  |
Considering the situation, better results were achieved by preventive measures which included blocking the caravan tracks. But even that was accompanied by a number of problems.
In Afghanistan, the occupation of caravanner has been passed from generation to generation. From the childhood, caravanners learned the country and its roads to perfection. Cargoes were meticulously protected by the most experienced mujahidin. Caravans were mostly small and consisted of one or several cars or camels and horses. Large caravans counted to 100 pack animals or cars, and were well guarded. While leading the caravan, Afghan guerrillas paid much attention to route reconnaissance.
Soviet reconnaissance faced numerous difficulties in exposing caravans. The most widespread reasons for that were great numbers of caravan routes and long periods of time needed for the gained information to reach the units blocking the caravan. Ambushes appeared to be an efficient tactics under such circumstances. But from the reconnaissance men it demanded perfect physical conditions and endurance, ability to orientate under harsh situation and terrain conditions, as well as to carefully camouflage, use war ruse and invent new tactical techniques and methods of operation.
In the early 1984, the 40th Army command developed a plan “Zanaves” (“The Curtain”). It provided for a set of actions on blocking the caravan tracks and cutting the supply of arms and ammunition to the armed opposition groups. According to the plan, some Army units were appointed to the zones of responsibility on the tensest directions on the Pakistan border – the southern and the eastern ones. The total length of the zones was more than 1000 km, and the depth - 100-300 km. The main load of the mission was placed on the reconnaissance units of the limited contingent, but motorized rifle units were also involved to the implementation of the plan.
| On July 14, 1984, reconnaissance company of 682nd motorized rifle regiment of 108th MRD commanded by Captain Valerii Hrynchak entered the battle with prevailing forces of mujahidin. In the course of the battle, he received heavy wounds of both legs, managed to administer first aid himself and continued to command the company’s actions. The recon co personnel were so inspired by the commander’s heroism that managed to win the battle. According to the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR from February 18, 1985, Captain Hrynchak was awarded the Title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the displayed courage and heroism while carrying his international duty in the DRA. |
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In October 1981, two separate Special Forces detachments – 154 SF sep det and 177 SF sep det – entered Afghanistan. They were deployed in the north of the country and were assigned to guard important industrial facilities. On February 10, 1984, 173 SF sep det was also brought to the DRA. It was stationed in Kandahar, frontier town on the caravan tracks crossing, which is a key post in the control system of the southern west of the country.
At the end of winter 1984, the Army command started to use Special Forces units according to its intended purposes. 177 SF sep det was transferred to the town of Hazni, situated on the important main road which unites the whole territory of the DRA. 154 SF sep det was deployed on the Pakistan direction in the town of Jalalabad. In autumn 1984, 668 SF sep det joined the 40th Army and was deployed near the town of Bahram, but in March 1985, it was transferred to Baraki.
Unlike standard structure of the Soviet Army Special Forces units of that time, SF detachments were armed with mechanized combat vehicles (infantry combat vehicles, airborne combat vehicles, armoured reconnaissance vehicles, and armoured infantry vehicles).
Major reconnaissance means were: examination, observation, ambushes, and reconnaissance search activities. The SF units widely used reconnaissance facilities of electronic intelligence, reconnaissance monitoring apparatus, air and secret agent intelligence.
One of the main tasks of the SF units was to expose and destroy (occupy) mujahidin caravans. In the course of the caravan exposure operation, the most difficult part was the advance of SF reconnaissance group to the place of possible caravan track because of the well-adjusted and highly branched system of enemy’s human intelligence.
| In 1984-1985, the 40th Army intelligence service was headed by Colonel Volodymyr Sapozhnik who previously dealt with the limited contingent intelligence and took place of division head in Turkestan military district. In his tenure of office, the intelligence system experienced great improvements. |
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| In 1985 – 1987, the 40th Army intelligence service was headed by Colonel Vadym Kokorin, former chief intelligence officer of 1st Guards Armoured Army of the Soviet troops’ group in Germany. Under his direct leadership, intelligence has further developed and improved reconnaissance means against the armed opposition groups, despite the difficult situation at those times. In 1986, intelligence section was reformed into Intelligence Department. On his return from Afghanistan, Colonel Kokorin worked in the Military academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR as a professor; and in 1988-1992 was the head of the intelligence service of Kyiv military district. |
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Structurally, SF detachments were joined into two brigades – 15 SF sep bde and 22 SF sep bde with HQs in Jalalabad and Lashkargakh. Each detachment’s strength was about 500 people, the total personnel’s complement of the both brigades was near 4, 000 people.
15 SF sep bde included 154, 177, 688, and 334 SF separate detachments, and 22 SF sep bde comprised 173, 370, 186, and 411 SF separate detachments.
All the SF units acted rather successfully. In particular, till the end of 1985, the scouts of 186 SF sep det conducted more than 200 combat operations and 45 survey flights. During such operations, the command mostly involved reconnaissance groups, reconnaissance detachments were rarely applied. Ambushes were the main reconnaissance means used in the operations. During them, units managed to destroy 370 mujahedeen, 34 cars and a great amount of ammunition; they also took 15 prisoners and acquired many weapons.
In late 1985, each SF brigade was reinforced by helicopter squadrons (hel sqn). 15 SF sep bde received 239 sep hel sqn, and 22 SF sep bde was enhanced by 205 sep hel sqn. The squadrons were added to support the activity of SF units. They were trained how to act in mountainous and desert terrain and were equipped with helicopters Mi – 8MT and Mi – 24.
Reinforcement of Special Forces’ units by helicopter squadrons influenced the tactics of scouts. In particular, the units’ command started to actively use observation groups, which by day and night surveyed caravan routes and tracks on helicopters, to observe large areas in order to track and intercept caravans.
The use of observation groups appeared to be rather efficient. During such survey flights in 1986, 186 SF sep det destroyed about 300 mujahidin and 6 cars, took 30 prisoners; and in 1987 the detachment managed to destroy 600 Afghan guerrillas, 39 cars, 34 motorcycles, took 17 prisoners and acquired a great amount of arms.
In addition to the task to fight against armed opposition groups, SF units were assigned to capture foreign military advisers cooperating with mujahidin, and acquire samples of modern armaments delivered to the militants by the Western countries.
Among the enemy’s armaments, high-technology equipment was of the greatest interest for the Soviet troops. In particular, they were interested in communication devices, mines and man-portable air defence systems. The appearance of new man-portable air defence systems “Stinger” in service of mujahidin in 1986 led to significant losses of the 40th Army aviation and limited the use of Soviet troops’ army and assault aviation – the most powerful support weapon of combined arms units’ activity. In order to work out countermeasures against the mujahidin’s air defence system, it was urgent to obtain the sample of MANPAD.
In autumn 1986, SF recon group from 173 SF sep det captured first samples of Stinger missile under Kandahar.
| One of the largest caravans in the history of Afghan war was captured on June 3, 1987 by the reconnaissance group of 177 SF sep det commanded by lieutenant Arthur Derevianko. The caravan included more than 200 camels carrying anti-aircraft installations, mortars, recoilless cannons and rocket missiles. The battle lasted for 6 hours. All the scouts of the reconnaissance group stayed alive. All in all, lieutenant’s Derevianko platoon hadn’t lost any soldier in over two years of combat operations in the DRA. |
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To arrange combat operations to the territory controlled by the enemy the scouts had to be more and more ingenious. Units broadly used combined secret advances to reconnaissance areas, long and secret observation over the reconnaissance objectives, comprehensive means of deluding the enemy about the reconnaissance targets, efforts to attract (coerce to advance) the enemy to the previously mined areas.
In early 1987, SF units conducted 840 reconnaissance operation flights. In this interval of time, Special Forces destroyed 131 caravans, 80 cars and 1416 mujahidin, captured 69 MANPADs, 4500 rocket missiles, 9000 kg of drugs and 2, 8 mln of charges – that was the third part of all the trophies of the 40th Army.
According to the 40th Army command estimates, their troops managed to intercept no more than the fifth part of all the caravans. There were some miscalculations and errors. They mostly happened because of inaccurate reconnaissance data and failures in reconnaissance planning and conduct; besides, underestimation of the enemy’s forces led to tragic consequences. SF groups were also several times entrapped by Afghan guerrillas.
| In October 1987, SF recon group of 186 SF sep det under the command of senior lieutenant Oleh Onishchuk captured a caravan with armaments near the kishlak Duri, not far from the Pakistan border. The scouts were attacked by soldiers of the greatly prevailing armed opposition group. Having shown courage and heroism in the unequal battle against the mujahidin, the overwhelming majority of the group’s personnel were killed. According to the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR from May 5, 1988, senior lieutenant Onishchuk was awarded the Title of Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously. |
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| SF recon group commanded by Captain Yaroslav Horoshko flew to help the Onishchuk’s group. The scouts entered a fierce battle against the Afghan guerrillas which greatly prevailed over them in numbers. By fire and in hand-to-hand combat they destroyed more than 20 militants, and carried the bodies of the dead scouts from the Onishchuk’s group out of the battlefield. On May 5, 1988, Captain Horoshko was awarded the Title of Hero of the Soviet Union. |
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In autumn 1988, 177 and 668 SF separate detachments were left in the DRA and acted in the north of the country and around Kabul. The main Special Forces’ tasks in the last months of the war were to intercept caravans and prevent mujahidin from bombarding the capital of Afghanistan and Soviet troops’ columns that moved from the country.
In order to achieve this, the command put additional roadblocks and strong points along the roads and on important heights. They were assigned to guard the troops’ halting places and prevent attempts of mujahidin to approach the roads. The SF operations area has gradually decreased, but despite that, the 40th Army reconnaissance units managed to capture 417 caravans during the late 1988.
Reconnaissance companies of 371 and 101 motorized rifle regiments covered the withdrawal of troops from Herat and Shindad in the western direction, 701 sep recon bn, 108 motorized rifle division and 783 sep recon bn, 201 motorized rifle division covered the forces in the eastern direction. Altogether, 199 sentry outposts were put out in the western direction from Kabul to the Soviet border.
The scouts of 783 sep recon bn became the last Soviet military men who left the territory of Afghanistan. They accompanied the 40th Army commander, and on February 15, 1989, crossed the state border.
